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in recent social and political theory. These are deployed
to attack, on the one hand, empirical political science
and, on the other hand, normative theory with universalist aspirations, such as that found in the work of
Rawls. Zolo argues that the complexity of modern societies and the resulting fragmentation of standards of
truth doom both of these enterprises. Instead, we
should begin with a view of politics as achieving "the
selective regulation of social risks." We accede to political authority because this serves to reduce the uncertainties of social life, which, in the contemporary world,
always tend to increase.
This leads to a view of democracy that we might call
neo-Schumpeterian. Zolo whole-heartedly endorses
Schumpeter's famous attack on "the classical doctrine of
democracy" but then goes on to argue that Schumpeter's own elite-competition model has been overtaken by
recent developments. Parties no longer genuinely compete to attract the popular vote: instead, they collude
with each other and establish client relationships with
groups outside the political sphere. The electorate no
longer possess even that minimum level of political
rationality needed to make the competitive model work.
Their political experience is constructed for them by the
mass media, which is most effective when not engaged
in overt propaganda. The resulting system, Zolo argues,
no longer deserves to be called a representative democracy: "liberal oligarchy" would be more accurate.
Having delivered this indictment, Zolo's book comes
to a sudden halt. He is hardly enchanted by the system
he has described, but he appears to lack the resources to
propose an alternative. Yet this disability is self-inflicted.
He has ruled out, on epistemological grounds, empirical
evidence that might, for instance, challenge his account
of the effects of the mass media. And his attack on
normative theory overlooks the fact that the systems he
is describing are held together, in part at least, by the
democratic principles espoused by their members, politicians, and voters alike. (One of the less helpful of
Zolo's borrowings is a form of functionalism that seeks
to explain the workings of the political system without
reference to the aims and intentions of the actors themselves.) That is why Rawls's ambition to defend a
normative theory by reference to the shared public
culture of liberal democracies is not absurd.
One might say that Zolo, having written his Prince,
ought now to attempt his Discourses. Yet this is a
challenging book for those inclined toward the radical
democratic view taken up by most of the contributors to
Mouffe's collection. Zolo lays his finger on the central
difficulty: "What this radical-democratic vision appears
to me to lack most of all is a perception of the variety,
particularism and mutual incompatibility of social expectations in non-elementary societies. It fails to consider
the structurally scarce nature both of social resources
and of the instruments of power responsible for the
allocation of politically distributable resources" (p. 70).
In other words, some, at least, of the conflicts thrown up
by a fragmented society are zero-sum; and simply to
encourage higher levels of political participation by
hitherto excluded or passive groups does nothing to
resolve this problem.
The challenge for would-be radical democrats is to
show how it is possible both to respect the separate
identities of the many groups that emerge in such a
society and, at the same time, to arrive at collective
decisions that are recognized as legitimate by all these

groups. How can we be authentically female, black, gay,
French-speaking, and so on but also equal citizens
identifying with the laws and policies of the state? The
challenge is a formidable one; and it is tempting to
escape it by taking refuge in diffuse and obscure formulations in which Mouffe's book, unfortunately, abounds.
Here, for instance, is the editor herself:
The creation of political identities as radical democratic
citizens depends thereforeon a collective form of identification among the democraticdemands found in a variety of
movements:women, workers,black, gay, ecological,as well
as in several other "new social movements." This is a
conception of citizenship which, through a common identification with a radicaldemocraticinterpretationof the principles of libertyand equality, aims at constructinga "we," a
chain of equivalenceamong theirdemands so as to articulate
them throughthe principleof democraticequivalence.(p. 236)
If this means anything at all, it suggests some spontaneous tempering of conflicting group demands in the
name of democracy. But why and how?
Not all the contributors to Mouffe's book are so
evasive. Candid recognition of the conflict between
personal identity and citizenship can be found in the
chapter by Jean Leca, who draws attention to the breakdown of a common culture (in France, especially) and
the increasing difficulty of establishing cultural communication between different groups (ethnic, regional,
etc.), and in an elegant essay by Michael Walzer, who
praises the rise of civil society as a sphere of free
association but sees that it cannot fully substitute for
democratic citizenship on the national scale. A robust
form of republicanism is defended by Sheldon Wolin in
the concluding chapter, and Mary Dietz endeavors to
make this stance more appealing to feminists (though
the constructive part of the argument remains somewhat
undeveloped). Another robust republican, Hannah
Arendt, is discussed in a helpful chapter by Maurizio
Passerin d'Entreves: d'Entreves perhaps underestimates
the distance that separates Arendt from the contemporary politics of identity.
One theme that is missing from Mouffe's book is the
idea of deliberative democracy, defended recently by
Joshua Cohen, James Fishkin, and several others. If we
are to acknowledge social complexity without falling
prey to the pessimistic conclusions of Zolo's realism, it is
to the possibilities of democratic dialogue between competing groups that we must surely look.
Nuffield College, Oxford
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Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics.
By Mary P. Nichols. Savage: Rowman & Littlefield,
1991. 233p. $50.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.
The Public and the Private in Aristotle's Political Philosophy. By Judith A. Swanson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 244p. $32.95.
These two studies-both eminently worth readinghave several points in common. Both Mary Nichols and
Judith Swanson are sympathetic readers of Aristotle
who seek to make sense of his texts without denying
their difficulty and ambiguity. Both acknowledge the
strangeness of those texts as seen from any modern
point of view, but both presuppose-and then go on to
show-that these texts are nevertheless pertinent for our
own thinking about politics. Both avoid the sort of
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anachronistic, simplifying, and inevitably condescending reconstruction of Aristotle as a systematic philosopher that characterizes both Anglo-American analytic
philosophical studies and the critical dismissals of Aristotle from historicist and poststructuralist perspectives.
Biographically, both authors express gratitude to Joseph
Cropsey in their prefaces. Thematically, both are concerned with the problem of how to understand what
Aristotle means by including, as an integral part of his
political theorizing (both in Ethics 10 and Politics 7), the
apparently antipolitical proposition that the political life
cannot be ranked as highly as the philosophical or
contemplative life; and both respond to this question in
novel and interesting ways.
But the answers the two books give to this interpretive
puzzle are diametrically opposed to one other. For
Swanson, Aristotle's explicit preference for philosophy
is meant to call attention to the dangers of the political
life and the attractiveness of lives lived outside the
public realm; whereas Nichols, places Aristotle's occasionally explicit preference for philosophy in the context
of the Politics as a whole to show that this preference is
not antipolitical but carries with it the message that
philosophy is only possible for those who live a certain
kind of political life. The interpretive controversy is a
legitimate and necessary one, since Aristotle's brief
discussion in Ethics 10 and scattered remarks in Politics 7
give no unequivocal answer to the question of how this
infrequent privileging of philosophy over politics can be
made to comport with his extensive defense of the
political life, properly understood. Nichols and Swanson, in effect, give two quite different responses to the
interpretive problem of what to do with Aristotle's
ranking of philosophy over politics. Their interpretations open the way (as such interpretations should) to
serious reflection on the politics of our own time. For
Swanson, Aristotle's elevation of philosophy yields a
defense of modern liberalism that can avoid the weaknesses of present-day rights-based or utilitarian political
theories; for Nichols, reading Aristotle on this question
can lead us to a more complex and less utopian understanding of politics than any modern political theory
a
can, an understanding that-surprisingly-provides
powerful clarification and justification of modern democracy.
Stylistically, these are also two very different kinds of
book. Nichols presents her novel and often controversial
interpretations (e.g., that "polity" is the simply best
regime, that the regime "according to prayer" is called
the best only in irony, and that the best human life is
impossible without political activity) in the form of a
topic-by-topic and book-by-book commentary on the
Politics. But her commentary is never so detailed that it
fails to keep the whole text in view, thus opening her
reading to question and revision by other readers of the
Politics. All of us who teach the Politics, no matter how
many or how few times we have done it before, will
teach the book better and with more pleasure having
read Nichols. The book should be of value both for
experienced Aristotelians who need to see the text with
a freshly invigorated eye and for beginning, nonspecialist teachers who are looking for interesting ways to
problematize the Politics for their students.
Swanson's argument for her equally controversial
thesis, on the other hand, ranges over Aristotle's corpus
as a whole, connecting Aristotelian ideas and lines of
argument that are generally not connected, rather than

commenting intensively on a single text. Her claim is
that-contrary to modern communitarian interpreters of
varying political stripes-Aristotle's political philosophy
establishes the supreme human value of a set of activities-including, but not limited to, philosophizing, the
family, friendships, and the economy-that can flourish
only within the private realm, activities that are inevitably threatened by the public. Her application of the
private/public distinction to the text is less problematic
than it may, at first glance, appear to be. While Aristotle
does not speak of a distinction between private and
public as such and thus does not himself explicitly assert
anything about the value of either "the private" or "the
public," Swanson's use of these terms as a way to open
a dialogue with Aristotle is by no means an anachronistic imposition of modern concepts on a Greek text. One
clear instance of a conception of "the private" in Greek
philosophy is in Plato's Laws 739c-d, where the Athenian Stranger distinguishes between "what is called the
private" and that which is said to be common, arguing
that in the best regime everything would be common,
including that which is by nature private, such as the
eyes and the ears and the hands. There can be little
doubt that Aristotle would both understand and reject
the Stranger's claim; the modern formulation of the
private/public issue would thus not be hopelessly unintelligible to the voice we can imagine speaking to us in
the texts of Aristotle.
In essence, Swanson says that modern liberalism can
borrow from Aristotle a defense of the private realm that
is stronger than the familiar Lockean argument for the
separation of private and public realms. There is a
serious practical difficulty about this, however, in that
Swanson's Aristotle would defend the private out of a
deep mistrust of democratic public opinion, which he
takes to be the principal obstacle to the development of
human virtue. Thus, to accept Swanson's Aristotle on
privacy, modern liberals would have to be convinced of
the wisdom of abandoning their commitment to liberal
democracy.
Be that as it may, Swanson's Aristotle is concerned
with establishing a robust private world that might
shield good and potentially good human beings against
the corrupting influence of public opinion (pp. 207-08).
There is, for her Aristotle, a reciprocity between private
and public that is really a kind of rapprochement between the few and the many: the private sphere educates good rulers for the city, while the city, in exchange,
protects the privacy and the private achievements of the
more virtuous few. A central interpretive difficulty is
how to make Swanson's picture square with two Aristotelian claims: (1) that a human life lived outside the
laws is more likely to be beastly than angelic and (2) that
for these laws to educate in virtue effectively, there must
be not only widespread public consent but a significant
degree of political participation, as well. When they are
not actively appropriated by a majority of the citizens,
the laws must fail to perform their primary function of
supplying a moralizing authority that defines the city
without reducing it to a unity. Swanson's response here
is that the maintenance and revision of the laws and
customs of any given polity are not of great concern
because there is, for Aristotle, both a readily knowable
natural hierarchy among human beings and a readily
knowable substantive natural law to guide practical
reason. (Aristotle, to most Straussians and to Nichols,
seems to deny both of these things.) So long as the few
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who are best by nature rule, guided only by their
independent judgment and by the precepts of a natural
law that is embedded in the unwritten customs of every
polity, there is no reason to be much troubled by those
laws that make Athens distinctly Athenian.
The spin that Swanson puts on Aristotle is opposed to
Arendtian and communitarian readings; but her own
theoretical framework is not evident (to this reader, at
least), though it seems to be in the direction of Oakeshott and possibly Voegelin, rather than Strauss. But
this is never altogether clear, so it is difficult to ascertain
what overall political theoretical conception supplies the
context and motive for Swanson's unusual reading of
Aristotle. This makes it hard to see any consistent
narrative or discursive line to her argument as it moves
from chapter to chapter to consider the virtues that her
Aristotle thinks must be developed in the household
(rather than the city), in the relation between master and
slave, in the separate spheres of husband and wife, in
the economic market, in friendship, and in philosophy.
Her writing is sometimes awkward and stilted and
conjures a very censorious and moralistic Aristotle, as
though she were not yet fully comfortable with her texts.
A provocative and wide-ranging study of this kind
always risks relying too heavily on quirky readings of
single passages taken out of context, on theory-driven
readings of ambiguous passages, and on repeatedly
exaggerated formulations of the point the author urgently wants us to hear. Swanson's work sometimes
suffers from all these weaknesses, but her occasional
stylistic infelicities do not obscure the novelty and the
importance of what she has to say. There is something
powerfully plausible in her assertion that Aristotle at
least implies a conception of the private not as a protected space for pursuing one's own good in one's own
way but as an opportunity for cultivating virtues. Swanson has read widely and well, and the book vividly calls
attention to the various ways in which Aristotle's discussions of character and moral education regard public
life with a much higher degree of suspicion than any
ardent communitarian, ancient or modern, would display.
Mary Nichols is a master of the difficult rhetorical art
of exposing her arguments to challenge without abandoning them, and because of this, her book speaks with
an unusual authority that must arise from many hours
intelligently spent reading and thinking and conversing
about the meaning of the Politics. Citizens and Statesmenis
a marvel of close reading combined with clarity and
consummate accessibility. For Swanson's Aristotle, political life is neither ennobling nor challenging. For
Nichols's Aristotle, it is both. Her study takes, as its
point of departure, the dispute between "democratic"
and "aristocratic" interpreters of the Politics, both of
whom see in Aristotle a way of challenging modern
liberalism by bringing to the fore qualities that liberalism
seems to lack-democratic readers stressing Aristotle's
focus on the importance of a political community composed of equal and participatory citizens, aristocratic
readers, Aristotle's recognition of human inequality and
of the importance of leadership by virtuous statesmen.
Nichols's argument is that the two readings are each
partially true and partially distorting; each exaggerates
one element in Aristotle's political understanding, by
depreciating either the extent to which Aristotle acknowledges human inequality (the typical failure of the
democratic reading) or the extent to which he is aware of

the dangers of falsely claiming superiority or overstating
the degree of superiority of some to others (the typical
failure of the aristocratic reading). Nichols's position is
that good politics for Aristotle must accommodate the
just claims of both the democratic many and the statesmanly few; to hold otherwise, she argues, is to court
democratic or oligarchic despotism. Statesmen and democratic citizens are mutually dependent. Without some
degree of democratic participation as a check on their
powers, statesmen are likely to forget that they are
humans subject to human limitations and incline to
substitute tyranny for polity; without statesmanly leadership, citizens will fall into factional conflict and reduce
the political community to civil war.
Similarly, philosophy and political activity are mutually supportive activities. Statesmanship involves learning the complexity of the world, learning what can be
controlled and what is beyond control. By acting as
statesmen and only by acting as statesmen, philosophers like Aristotle are in a position to understand
themselves and so to make a step toward understanding
the whole. The Politics itself, Nichols argues, involves
statesmanship of this kind. Nichols is careful not to
dissolve all difference between philosophy and statesmanship. (Unlike the statesman, Aristotle's chief interest, she says, is not establishing the best possible polis
but understanding beings.) But there is no immediate
royal road to wisdom for Nichols's Aristotle: the path to
such understanding lies only through the city. Her
account of the need for mediation and indirection in
Aristotle's version of philosophic education recalls the
Platonic Socrates' flight to the logoi (rational and rambling speeches, as opposed to algorithmic deduction or
intuitive silence) and to self-understanding as a necessary stage of the human journey to wisdom, in spite of
the fact that she, too, often insists on a picture of a
rigidly aristocratic Plato to serve as a foil for her more
flexible and democratic Aristotle. It is also the case that
her reading needs to be tempered by readings like Judith
Swanson's. I would add that, contra Nichols, the road
through politics and self-understanding is not the only
option Aristotle suggests for our indirect approach to the
hidden truths of things. Potentiality, actuality and the
other central elements of first philosophy can also be
approached through the careful study of nature and the
many natures-through what we call natural science. In
the end, what matters most is that both Nichols and
Swanson implicitly maintain still a third mode of indirect
access to the things that are, the way of articulate and
critical reflection on texts such as Aristotle's Politics.
Bryn Mawr College

STEPHEN SALKEVER

The Quality of Life. Edited by Martha Nussbaum and
Amartya Sen. New York: Oxford University Press,
1993. 452p. $65.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.
This plump volume records the proceedings of a
conference held at Helsinki in 1988, under sponsorship
of the UN's World Institute for Development Economics
Research (WIDER). We are told on the fly sheet that
WIDER's purpose "is to help identify and meet the need
for policy-oriented socioeconomic research on pressing
global and development problems, as well as common
domestic problems and their interrelationships." It is
not altogether easy to see how this conference and the
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